Oil Logistics Lesson from WWII - 3

And now a bit on Caucasus...

Hitler was extremely interested in capturing the oil fields of the Caucasus including those in Maikop (Russia) and Grozny (Chechnya) and most of all Baku (Azerbaijan). As Daniel Yergin mentions in his in his book The Prize, Hitler’s assault in the Caucasus was scheduled for September 25, 1942, under the code name Edelweiss.

A few days before that date, Hitler’s generals presented him with a large cake decorated with Caspian Sea and Baku. Hitler ate the Baku piece. (There exists a documentary film about it). But Baku was never captured because of fighting on two fronts at the same time. The fight in Stalingrad was proved to me much more difficult than originally thought. Even though Field Marshal Erich von Manstein begged Hitler to transfer some of the forces from the Caucasus to his command (Sixth Army at Stalingrad) he did got nothing. This misjudgement caused the first major defeat of Germans in Europe.

Hitler had a big point though. In 1940 Baku was producing 22.2 million metric tons of oil, comprising 72% of total Soviet oil production. In 1941, it produced 25.4 Mt.

As one commentator mentioned (comment to my previous post) allies (Great Britain and France) considered the possibility of bombing Azerbaijan's oil fields. They were deeply concerned that Stalin's supply of Baku's oil might be transferred to Hitler after the Soviet German Pact was signed on August 23, 1939, which was not materialized.

Here is a somewhat detailed explanation about it coming from an article (World War II and Azerbaijan) appeared in Azerbaijan International, Summer 1995.

On October 31, 1939, such attacks were actually under discussion at the British General Headquarters. However, by that time most politicians and diplomats (including Prime Minister Chamberlain and Winston Churchill as Minister of Naval Forces) in the UK were opposed to bombing Baku, expressed their disapproval and tried to convince the others that a more feasible plan would be to prevent the transportation of oil in the Black Sea with British submarines.

It is said that the French Government ordered General Gamelen and Admiral Darlan to work out a "plan of possible intervention with the view of destroying Russian oil exploitation." The US Ambassador to France, W. Bullit informed US President Franklin D. Roosevelt that Daladye considered that aircraft attacks against Baku would be "the most efficient way to weaken the Soviet Union."

On January 11, 1940, the British Embassy in Moscow notified London that demolishing Baku's oil fields would be "a knock-out" for the Soviets. According to the document, "Basic Strategies of the War" submitted on January 23, 1940, to the British General Headquarters by the Staff Commands, "The Russian economy was strongly dependent on oil supplies from Baku", a region which was easily accessible for British dive-bombers stationed in Iraq. Another possibility was by the French Air Forces in Syria.

According to a report submitted on February 22, 1940, by General Gamelen to French Prime Minister Daladye, "Dependence on oil supplies from the Caucasus is the fundamental weakness of Russian economy...... interruption of oil supplies on any large scale would have far-reaching consequences and could even result in the collapse of all the military, industrial and agricultural systems of Russia."

In April 1940 Intelligence flights by the British and French Air Forces did fly over the Absheron Peninsula where Baku is located. However, the bombing mission was not carried out although everything was in place to do so by the end of June. More likely than not, this was meant as a threat to pressure Stalin's regime. However, after Hitler invaded Holland, Belgium and France on May 10, 1940, the "Absheron targets" lost their significance.

But by late July 1942, Hitler's quest for Baku seemed well on its way to achieving his goal. The Germans had already captured the city of Rostov and severed the oil pipeline from the Caucasus. On August 9, they reached Maikop, the most westerly of the Caucasian oil centers-which turned out to be quite a small source for the Germans. Even under normal conditions, Maikop's production was only one tenth that of Baku's. However, before withdrawing from the city, the Russians had thoroughly destroyed the oil fields and supplies and equipment, right down to the small incidental tools of the workshops. Consequently, by January 1943, the Germans were able to eke out no more than 70 barrels per day there (Yergin, 336-337).

In the summer of 1942, the threat of German attack became so strong that the Soviet authorities decided to terminate drilling operations to evacuate the most valuable machinery and equipment further East. By autumn, 764 wells in Baku were sealed and 81 complete sets of drilling equipment together with the personnel were transported to Turkmenistan.

And that happened when the demand for fuel was increasing. To resolve the problem, machine building and equipment manufacturing plants in Baku began converting their factories, and diversifying production. Working around the clock, they were able to manufacture sufficient piping at the Azneftecombinat factory to repair 25 old wells that had not been used for decades. Since it was impossible to drill new wells, the old ones were exploited to full capacity.

Another problem inseparably tied to fuel production was its transportation. By the summer of 1942 Germans had blocked the main railways through which oil and its derivative products were transported. Thus, alternate means of transport had to be found via the Caspian and Volga water way. When the Germans also succeeding in blocking this route, transportation was routed through Central Asia.

Then the naval experts of the Baku oil-tanker fleet performed an incredible feat. For the first time in the world's history, they began towing a floating railway of oil tankers (wagons) from Baku to Krasnovodsk (Turkmenistan) as well as several thousands tons of oil reservoirs from Makhachkala (Dagestan) to Krasnovodsk.

The fleets were extremely overloaded. For example, the amount of oil transport in July 1941 exceeded 10 million barrels of crude oil and fuel. This amount was beyond the technical capabilities of the tanker fleet in Baku. But the demands from Moscow did not take into account the physical limitations. It was then that Baku naval experts hit upon the idea of attaching whole tanks and cisterns to each other by steel ropes and lowering them into the sea by cranes and towing them by steam tugs. This had never been done before in any place in the world and it enabled them to tow up to 35 cisterns together or 3 huge oil tanks (5 ton capacity) with a single tugboat.

Meanwhile, the enemy was closing in on Baku. On September 9, 1942, martial law was declared in Transcaucasia. The danger of an attack on Azerbaijan was becoming more likely. The emergency measures which had been prepared beforehand were set into operation-Azerbaijanis began closing the functioning wells with plans, if necessary, to explode the wells themselves so that the Germans wouldn't get a single drop of oil.

Because of the crisis, the State Defense Committee decided to transfer the main forces of oil-workers and oil enterprises of Baku to the regions of Volga, Ural Mountains, Kazakhstan and Central Asia for the enforcement of the oil extraction there. In October, 1942, more than ten thousand oil workers left for these eastern parts.

All the nine drilling offices, oil-expedition and oil-construction trusts as well as various other enterprises with their staffs were transferred to an area near Kuybishev, (Russia Federation in Tartarstan near the Ural Mountains north of Kazakhstan). This city soon came to be known as "the Second Baku".

Despite the severe frost the drillers started searching for oil and thanks to day and night working, the Bakuis in the region of Povolzhye increased the fuel extraction in "Kinelneft" trust that first year by 66% and by 42% in entire region of Kuybishev. As a result, five new oil and gas fields were discovered and huge oil refinery construction projects were undertaken, including the first pipe line between Kuybishev and Buturslan was built that same year.

Beginning in late 1943 drilling work in Baku was reestablished. However, the sealing off of a number of wells turned out to be a tragedy. Many of them were impossible to restore. Eventually, the oil extracting had considerably been reduced by the end of the war: in 1945 only 11.5 million tons of oil was extracted.

PS: You might also be interested in my previous posts on the same subject: Oil Logistics Lessons from WWII , Oil Logistics Lesson from WWII - 2 and Fuel Logistics Lesson from WWII.

Oil Logistics
Military Oil Consumption

Oil Logistics Lesson from WWII - 2

Now Let's talk about Japan

In order to be able to achieve oil independence, the Japanese planned to acquire natural petroleum sources in Southeast Asia and at the same time tried to establish a synthetic fuel industry for the conversion of coal to oil.

The Japanese had begun research on synthetic fuel in the 1920s but failed to make a successful transition from small to large-scale production. They derived significant quantities from the technologically simpler coal carbonization and shale oil distillation processes. In the last year of World War II, the Japanese attempted to revive their synthetic fuel industry and entered into an agreement with IG Farben for technical assistance. But Germany's defeat ended this final effort. As a result their high-quality basic scientific research did not translate into large-scale technological success.

Oil played an extremely important role in the Japanese decision to go to war with the US in 1941. When diplomatic efforts failed to resolve the deteriorating political situation with the US, the UK and Netherlands East Indies (due to oil embargo), the future of Japan’s oil supply was in danger.

By September 1941, Japanese oil reserves had dropped to 50 million barrels, and their navy alone was burning 2,900 barrels of oil every hour.

They had to do something. Wait and run out of fuel or go to war for oil. Japan selected the latter and started to make plans to seize and secure as much oil[1] and other resources as possible militarily what it could not achieve diplomatically.

A very long and detailed preparation was undertaken to attack Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. (note that Hitler declared war on the United States on 11 December 1941). The raid at Pearl Harbor was a stepping stone to achieve that overall goal. The plans included the locations of fuel-storage depots lying there.

The damage on Pearl Harbor was not as big as it could have been if commanders were not myopic.

The Japanese strategic disregard of the fragile oil infrastructure was incredible. They simply did not attack oil supply at Pearl Harbor, neither US oilers nor tankers in the Pacific.

On top of that a second strike (originally planned to focus on the dockyards, fuel tanks, and remaining ships) was canceled, which reflected preoccupation of Japanese commanders with tactical rather than logistical targets.

Lit. Col. Patrick Donovan[2] gives an excellent overview of the fuel logistics in the Pacific along with valuable information on Pearl Harbor attack. I just give below some important points, supported with some pictures.

The entire fuel supply for the Pacific Fleet was stored in above-ground tanks on the eastern side of the naval base. The Navy had just finished restocking its tanks in Pearl Harbor to their total capacity of 4.5 million barrels of oil. One single bullet would be enough to blow off the area.

The total capacity of the Pacific Fleet’s oilers was 760,000 barrels of oil. Thus, the fleet was tied to its oil supply at Pearl Harbor. If the Japanese had attacked the oil storage and the associated oilers[3] at Pearl Harbor on 7 December, they would have driven the Pacific Fleet back to the west coast.

Furthermore, Japan didn’t learn from that mistake. From December 1941 to October 1942, Japanese submarines attacked just 19 merchant ships between Hawaii and the west coast; 15 of these were in December 1941. The result? Not even need to be mentioned. Overconfidence, poor tactics, and a mentality that stressed commerce and logistical targets were not worthy of destruction for Japanese.

German submarines, on the contrary, sank 391 ships in the western Atlantic, 141 of which were tankers. One quarter of the US tanker fleet was sunk in 1942. But neither the German nor the Japanese Navy considered mutual cooperation in war planning a matter of much importance when Germany and Japan entered into their alliance with each other.

Whereas, the fuel supplies at Pearl Harbor were crucial for the US Navy to bring the war to the Japanese Navy. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz summed up the situation best, “Had the Japanese destroyed the oil, it would have prolonged the war another two years.”

Aerial view of the Naval Operating Base, Pearl Harbor, looking southwest on 30 October 1941.
Ford Island Naval Air Station is in the center, with the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard just beyond it, across the channel. The airfield in the upper left-center is the Army's Hickam Field

Aerial view of the Submarine Base (right center) with the fuel farm at left, looking south on 13 October 1941.
Among the 16 fuel tanks in the lower group and ten tanks in the upper group are two that have been painted to resemble buildings (topmost tank in upper group, and rightmost tank in lower group). Other tanks appear to be painted to look like terrain features. Alongside the wharf in right center are USS Niagara (PG-52) with seven or eight PT boats alongside (nearest to camera), and USS Holland (AS-3) with seven submarines alongside. About six more submarines are at the piers at the head of the Submarine Base peninsula.

Aerial view of the Submarine Base, with part of the fuel farm in the foreground, looking southwest on 13 October 1941
Note the artfully camouflaged fuel tank in center, painted to resemble a building. Also camouflaged as a building is the most distant fuel tank in the upper left.The building beside the submarine ascent tower (in right center, shaped like a backwards "C") housed the U.S. Fleet Headquarters at the time of the Japanese attack on 7 December 1941. Alongside the wharf in right center are USS Niagara (PG-52) with several PT boats alongside (nearest to camera), and USS Holland (AS-3) with seven submarines alongside. About six more submarines are at the piers at the head of the Submarine Base peninsula. USS Wharton (AP-7) is the large ship at left.

Lesson: The old saying “Amateurs talk strategy, and professionals talk logistics,” is still valid.


Notes:
[1] Read also Byron King on more info about this.
[2] Lieutenant Colonel Patrick H. Donovan, “Oil Logistics in the Pacific War”, Air Force Journal of Logistics, Volume XXVIII, No.1. Spring 2004, p.30-44.
[3] The Navy classified its oil tankers as fleet oilers.


PS: You might also be interested in my two previous posts on the same subject: Oil Logistics Lessons from WWII and Fuel Logistics Lesson from WWII.

PS2: One commentator mentioned (comment to my previous post) allies (Great Britain and France) considered the possibility of bombing oil fields in Caucasus . I will discuss that together with Azerbaijan in my next post.

Oil Logistics
Military Oil Consumption

Oil Logistics Lessons from WWII

During the WWII American and Russian armies were well supplied with POL (petroleum, oil and lubricants) and communications during and after the war indicated that there were no significant delays or shortages of oil which caused any serious interruption or change of plans.

The oil refining’s weak point was too low production of high-octane aviation fuels. Lend-lease-based American supplies eliminated the deficiency. The United States provided the USSR with 1.24 million tonnes of high-octane fuels and their components during the war. (source)

There was of course a few instances of fuel shortage.

For example, in August 1944, when the 3rd Army of George Patton remained without fuel, Patton shouted at General Omar Bradley, “Damned, Brad, give me 400,000 gallons of fuel and I’ll deliver you to Germany within two days!.....My main problem is gas, not the Germans.” Bradley reported to Commander-in-Chief Dwight Eisenhower in September 1944: “My soldiers can eat leather belts but tanks need fuel.”

The 6th Tank Corps, 3rd Tank Army, 1st Ukrainian Front was raging towards Berlin, which was about 30 km away. When the tank crews were almost out of fuel, they radioed a plaintext message: "Give us more fuel!" The German 4th Tank Army, fighting its way westward, intercepted the message.

The Germans drew a correct conclusion, and the Soviet tank corps suffered a severe blow outside Barut. Soviet tank crews killed in action are buried in the bed of honour south of Barut. Until the early 1990s all military vehicles, passing Barut, had used to honk their horns. Back then there was a saying: "No matter what hurry you may be in, refuel, otherwise you may end up in Barut." (source)

In some cases the Allies were also extremely creative. For example, fuel supplies to the continent from England through pipelines. A similar pipeline construction took place to provide fuel to Leningrad. (29 km line, of which 21 km was under the sea, was constructed in 50 days).

Soviets and Americans not only had their indigenous supply sources but also had a separate service of fuel supplies.

Soviet Oil Logistics

Georgy Michailovich Shirshov, retired major general in Russian Armed Forces documents very valuable stories, written for Oil News LukOil Overseas Holding Ltd Corporate news about the Soviet oil logistics experience during the WWII.

The Red Army Fuel Service was established in 1933 owing to Corps Commander Nikolai Movchin (1896-1938), who realized necessity of the new kind of logistics for the modern mechanized forces. It was the first fuel service in the world military history. Through this Service Soviet military forces received upwards of 20 million tonnes of fuel.[1]

The agenda of the special sessions of Red Army’s General Staff in summer 1941 constantly included a question of how to provide mechanised and armoured units with fuel. Reports to the General Staff usually contained this very phrase. In July 1941, the lack of coordination between the General Staff and Red Army Fuel Supply Department enabled German pilots and saboteurs to blow up almost the whole of the frontline forces’ fuel reserves. (source)

In 1925 Stalin had stated the meaning of oil: “The oil question is a vital one, since the one having more oil will command in a future war”. And Hitler understood it very well.

German Oil Logistics Hopes

Oil was the fuel of the future, and to insure that Germany would never lack a plentiful supply, German scientists and engineers synthesized petroleum from their country’s abundant coal supplies and thereby established the world’s first technologically successful synthetic fuels industry.

In the mean time, Henry Deterding of Royal Dutch/Shell, who, as British Prime Minister Winston Churchill nimbly remarked, had only two devotions – his German secretary and Adolf Hitler. And probably Hitler was counting on him a lot but Deterding’s suspicious death in 1939 forced Hitler change his plans.

Meanwhile the attempts to prevent Germany from using the Romanian Ploiesti oilfields failed. As early as before the capitulation of France, both the British and French governments offered Romania $60 million for self-destroying its oilfields and, thus, preventing Germany from exploiting them. However, the parties failed to agree about the price, so [2]the Romanian oil came to Nazi Germany. (source)

As I discussed in my previous post Germans were already relying heavily on synthetic fuel production. Germany had the first technologically successful synthetic fuel industry producing eighteen million metric tons (128 million barrels) from coal and tar hydrogenation and another three million metric tons from the F-T synthesis in the period 1939-1945. After the war ended German industry did not continue synthetic fuel production because the Potsdam Conference of 16 July 1945 prohibited it.

Meanhile, German army commanders strictly prohibited bombing fuel depots and dispatched their commando teams to seize them. But Allied forces could not grasp the importance of oil.

The chief of the US bomber fleet at the European theatre of war, General Karl Spaats, had repeatedly asked Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forced in Europe Dwight Eisenhower for permission to attack those plants, but in vain. Finally, Eisenhower gave his consent, and on 12 May 1944, 935 US bombers attacked synthetic fuel plants. Soon afterwards, the Churchill-led British military cabinet that had strictly prohibited bombing fuel plants east of the Rhine allowed striking them.

On 15 May 1944, the commander of RAF’s bomber force, Air Marshal Arthur Harris, nicknamed Bomber ordered 99 RAF bombers to attack the German refineries….Throughout the period of fighting for Caucasian oil, the Soviet Army lost 344,390 people, while the German Army lost 281,000 soldiers and officers in the offensive operation alone. That was a price for oil called “the blood of war.”(source)

Lessons

The following four quotes from WWW Virtual Library: Logistics are worth to remember.

“You will not find it difficult to prove that battles, campaigns, and even wars have been won or lost primarily because of logistics.”
General Dwight D. Eisenhower

“Logistics comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans of strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the troops to this point.”
General Antoine Henri Jomini, Precis de l'Art de la Guerre (The Art of War), 1838

“Logistics...in the broadest sense, the three big M's of warfare--material, movement, and maintenance. If international politics is 'the art of the possible,' and war is its instrument, logistics is the art of defining and extending the possible. It provides the substance that physically permits an army to live and move and have its being.”
James A. Huston, The Sinews of War: Army Logistics 1775-1953, 1966

“The essence of flexibility is in the mind of the commander; the substance of flexibility is in logistics.”
Rear Admiral Henry Eccles, U.S. Navy

To those we must add Erwin Rommel: “Fuel shortages! It is just enough to make one cry,” “The bravest soldiers can do nothing without weapons, weapons are nothing without ammunition, but in terms of mobile war neither weapons nor ammunition cost much without means of transportation with the necessary volume of fuel for engines.”

Also not to forget Admiral Karl Doenitz, head of Germany’s submarine fleet : “Can anyone tell me what good tanks and trucks and airplanes are if the enemy doesn’t have the fuel for them?”

“God was on the side of the nation that had the oil”
Professor Wakimura, Tokyo Imperial University in Postwar Interrogation

In the next post I will discuss the experience or inexperience of Japan concerning oil logistics in WWII, with a special emphasis to Pearl Harbor.

What we should still keep in mind, especially today, that
the old saying “Amateurs talk strategy, and professionals talk logistics,” is still valid.


Notes
[1] Georgy Michailovich Shirshov, retired major general in Russian Armed Forces documents very valuable stories, written for LukOil Overseas Holding Ltd Oil News about the Soviet oil logistics experience during the WWII.
[2] See Anthony N. Stranges of Texas A&M University on excellent review on Germany’s Synthetic Fuel Industry 1927-45.


Synthetic Fuel
Oil Logistics
Military and Oil

Fuel Logistics Lesson from WWII

Fuel logistics played an extremely important role in World War II. The war was won by the allies thanks to their well organized logistics and uninterrupted fuel supplies. Germany and especially Japan had bitter experiences on how important fuel logistic is in warfare.

Here I will just talk a bit about the German experience.

Hitler was determined to make Germany independent from outside sources. By the time he became chancellor in 1939, four methods[1] of synthetic fuel production methods were either available or were in early stages of production.

Germany was dependent on external sources for an adequate supply of oil even before the WWII and the termination of overseas imports endangered its ability to conduct mobile warfare.

Before the war, German oil supplies came from three different sources: imports from abroad, production by domestic oil fields, and syntheses of petroleum products from coal. But all these were not enough to assist the country’s need in war. Domestic production could not be relied on much because German oil fields were depleting. Therefore Germany relied more on the Romania’s oil[2] (allied with Germany), half of which had been exported to Germany. Besides that there were small oil production in Hungaria and Austria. But depletion of Romanian oil fields was not taken into account. Meanwhile, imports from overseas were cut.

Hence came the urgency to gain possession of the Russian oil fields in the Caucasus as the prime elements which led the decision to invade the Soviet Union in June 1941.
Germans captured the smallest of the Russian oil fields at Maikop in August 1942, and expected the two remaining fields and refineries in Grozny and Baku could also be captured, which was not achieved. Until January 1943, when Germans were compelled to withdraw from Maikop, they were able to extract about 4.7 million barrels (Mb).[3] Air raids on the Romanian Ploesti oil fields and refineries in August 1943 destroyed 50 percent of the Romanian refinery capacity.[4] In August 1944 Russians occupied the refineries at Ploesti which eliminated this source of supply. So dependence on the synthetic plants became even greater than before.

In order to become less dependent on outside sources, the Germans undertook a sizable expansion program of their own meager domestic oil extraction. According to Goring (in 1938) Germany needed 88 Mb of oil in 1942/43 with a heavy emphasis to synthetic oil production. Even though he revised a year later his estimate downwards to 68 Mb he forgot one important element. Germany was lacking of steel.

The chief source of supply, and the only source for aviation gasoline, was 13 synthetic plants together with a small production from three additional ones that started operations in 1944. The share of synthetic oil in total oil supply went up to 50% in 1944 from 20% in 1939.

Albert Speer oversaw Goring’s vision and did not construct as many plants as required with the excuse of short supply of steel. But in summer 1943 Field Marshal Erhard Milch was sending the alarm bells “The hydrogenation plants are our most vulnerable spots; with them stands and falls our entire ability to wage war. Not only will planes no longer fly, but tanks and submarines also will stop running if the hydrogenation plants should actually be attacked.”

By July 1944 every major plant had been hit. These plants were producing an average of 316,000 tons per month when the attacks began. Their production fell to 107,000 tons in June and 17,000 tons in September. Output of aviation gasoline from synthetic plants dropped from 175,000 tons in April to 30,000 tons in July and 5,000 tons in September. Production recovered somewhat in November and December, but for the rest of the war was but a fraction of pre-attack output.

Leuna was the largest of the synthetic plants. From the first attack to the end, production at Leuna averaged 9 percent of capacity. To win the battle with Leuna a total of 6,552 bomber sorties were flown against the plant, 18,328 tons of bombs were dropped and an entire year was required.[5]

For lack of fuel, pilot training, previously cut down, was further curtailed. Through the summer, the movement of German Panzer Divisions in the field was hampered more and more seriously as a result of losses in combat and mounting transportation difficulties, together with the fall in fuel production. When the Germans launched their counter-offensive on December 16, 1944, their reserves of fuel were insufficient to support the operation. Many panzer units were lost when they ran out of gasoline. In February and March of 1945 the Germans massed 1,200 tanks on the Baranov bridgehead at the Vistula to check the Russians. They were immobilized for lack of gasoline and overrun.

The following testimonies[6] of the German Reich’s ex-leaders make clear why oil and logistics were one of most important reasons in losing the war.

Generaleutnant Adolf Galland, Chief of Fighters, GAF: "In my opinion, it was the Allied bombing of our oil industries that had the greatest effect on the German war potential. Even our supplies for training new airmen were severely curtailed--we had plenty of planes from the autumn of 1944 on, and there were enough pilots up to the end of that year, but lack of petrol didn't permit the expansion of proper training to the air force as a whole.

General Jahn, Commander in Lombardy: "The attacks on the German transport system, coordinated with the serious losses in the fuel industry, had a paralyzing effect not only on the industries attacked but on all other German industries as well."

Generalmajor Albrecht von Massow, A.O.C. Training, GAF: "The attack on German oil production opened in 1944 was the largest factor of all in reducing Germany's war potential."

General Feldmarschall Karl Gerd von Rundstedt, Commander-in-Chief in the West before German surrender: "Three factors defeated us in the West where I was in command. First, the unheard-of superiority of your air force, which made all movement in daytime impossible. Second, the lack of motor fuel oil and gas -- so that the Panzers and even the remaining Luftwaffe were unable to move. Third, the systematic destruction of all railway communications so that it was impossible to bring one single railroad train across the Rhine. This made impossible the reshuffling of troops and robbed us of all mobility. Our production was also greatly interfered with by the loss of Silesia and bombardments of Saxony, as well as by the loss of oil reserves in Romania."

Generalleutnant Karl Jacob Veith, A.O.C. Flak Training: "The Allied breakthrough would have been utterly impossible without strategic as well as tactical bombing. The destruction of the oil industry and the simultaneous dislocation of the German communication system were decisive."

Generaloberst von Vietinghoff, Supreme Commander in Southwest (Italy): "Insofar as it is possible to judge from Italy, it is generally recognized that Allied air attacks [on the aircraft and fuel industries] were extremely successful. This is especially true with reference to attacks on the fuel industry, which by the end of the war proved to be the decisive factor."

Christian Schneider, manager of Leuna Works, one of Germany's largest synthetic gasoline and oil plants: "Up until a week ago (middle of April 1945), the Leuna plant was still operating, turning out a pitifully thin trickle of fuel. The output was so small compared with its capacity potential that production officials had difficulty plotting it on a chart. The 8th Air Force twice knocked out the plant so that the production was nil for a period of 15 days, and once the RAF did the same. Once after the attacks started, the plant got back to 70 percent capacity production for a period of 10 days. Another attack, and the plant got hack to 50 percent. But from then on it never got more than a mere drop in comparison to its capacity."

War Diary of the 7th German Army High Command (General Dollman), 11 June 1944: "Troop movements and all supply traffic by rail to the army sector must be considered as completely cut off. The fact that traffic on the front and in rear areas is under constant attack from Allied air power has led to delays and unavoidable losses in vehicles, which in turn have led to a restriction in the mobility of the numerous Panzer units due to the lack of fuel and the unreliability of the ammunition supply...

Hermann Goering, long-time chief of the Luftwaffe, made the following remarks during the course of several interrogations: "Allied attacks greatly affected our training program, too. For instance, the attacks on oil retarded the training because our new pilots couldn't get sufficient training before they were put into the air.”

"Allied selection of targets was good, particularly in regard to oil. As soon as we started to repair an oil installation, you always bombed it again before we could produce one ton.”

"If I had to design the Luftwaffe again, the first airplane I would develop would be the jet fighter, then the jet bomber. It is now a question of fuel. The jet fighter takes too much. The Me-264 awaited only the final solution of the fuel-consumption problem. According to my view the future airplane is one without fuselage (flying wing) equipped with turbine in combination with the jet and propeller.”

"Without the U. S. Air Force the war would still be going on elsewhere, but certainly not on German soil."

…..And the US was already prepared to have these conclusions. How?

Just look at the summary of a US Treasury Department Inter Office Communication dated December 6, 1941 on “Estimates of the German Oil Position”:

“All the available estimates indicate that Germany has been forced to dip into her oil reserves for the Russian campaign. The two up-to-date estimates, those of the British and Russians, both conclude that, as a result, Germany will be forced to restrict her military oil consumption. The British believe that the Germans will be able to do this fairly easily, whereas the Russians state that it may reduce German armored operations.”

Before carrying out the future adventurous operations the Pentagon should look at its own history and reexamine the lessons learned.


Notes:
[1] See Peter W. Becker (“The Role of Synthetic Fuel In World War II Germany,” Air University Review, July-August 1981) for the explanation of methods. He also gives an extensive discussion of oil situation in Germany during the war.
[2] Especially the Ploesti oil fields and refinery.
[3] This quantity was more or less the amount Germans would have received anyway from Soviet Union under the provisions of the friendship treaty of 1939.
[4] Romania exported about 13 Mb per year of oil to Germany between 1941 and 1943. In 1944 it was nearly halved. In 1938 Romanian exports to Germany was 2.8 Mb.
[5] From the Chapter “The Attack on Oil “, United States Strategic Bombing Survey SUMMARY REPORT (European War), September 30, 1945.
[6] From pages 62-66 of July 1945 issue of IMPACT, a CONFIDENTIAL wartime publication of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence. Scanning and formatting done by Air War College, Nonresident Studies.)

Complete Blog Index - 1

60 Marie Antoinette and Peak Oil October 2006
59 Hearing on DoD Energy Consumption October 2006
58 Neo Conservative Oil-Military-Industrial Complex -II September 2006
57 Neo Conservative Oil-Military-Industrial Complex September 2006
56 Long Live the Pentagon September 2006
55 F-22A: A DoD Gadget and its Budget September 2006
54 Turkey in the New Middle East Game September 2006
53 Middle East is Pregnant August 2006
52 Disinformation and Psychopolitics August 2006
51 The Future of Humanity August 2006
50 Small Arms Sales July 2006
49 Worldwide Conventional Arms Sales July 2006
48 The Other Face of the G8 July 2006
47 Israel Lebanon War and BTC Pipeline July 2006
46 Nuclear Weapons July 2006
45 Department of Defense Energy Strategy July 2006
44 US Navy Energy Policy July 2006
43 Oh These Senate Hearings July 2006
42 Pentagon and Peak Oil July 2006
41 US Air Force Energy Policy July 2006
40 US Army Energy Policy July 2006
39 Department of Defense Energy Policy June 2006
38 The US Military Bases June 2006
37 Petropolitics Laws of Thomas Friedman June 2006
36 Military Oil Consumption in Afghanistan and Iraq June 2006
35 Oh These Senate Hearings June 2006
34 Corporate Media on Oil June 2006
33 What Oil Market Fundamentals? May 2006
32 Magic Math of Karen Harbert May 2006
31 Nonsense NOPEC Legislation May 2006
30 Oil and US Military Interests III April 2006
29 Oil and US Military Interests II April 2006
28 Oil and US Military Interests I April 2006
27 Summary of Senate Hearings on Oil Prices April 2006
26 Exxon Chevron Peak Oil Ad War April 2006
25 King Hubbert at IIASA in 1975 April 2006
24 Judiciary Committee Hearing on Oil Prices April 2006
23 Port Insecurity and Beyond April 2006
22 Al-Qaeda and Al-Pentagon April 2006
21 Quadrennial Defense Review 2006 April 2006
20 US DoD Factsheet March 2006
19 The US Military Oil Consumption February 2006
18 State of the Union Address 2006 February 2006
17 New Record for Crude Oil Speculators January 2006
16 Big Oil Bosses and Cheney December 2005
15 Big Oil Bosses at the Congress Hearing December 2005
14 Peak Oil Madness October 2005
13 Peak Oil and Church October 2005
12 Nukes and Double Standards October 2005
11 Good Morning New Orleans! September 2005
10 How Media Reports the Same Thing Differently September 2005
9 This is Not You Yergin September 2005
8 Missing Barrels are Back September 2005
7 IMF Oil Price Joke September 2005
6 Chancellor Brown sees Black September 2005
5 Gordon Brown Debunked September 2005
4 A $10 rise in oil prices reduces world GDP 0.5 per cent or percentage point ? August 2005
3 How Media Uses Statistics for Brainwashing July 2005
2 From Afghanistan to Venezula with Love July 2005
1 Oil Prices and Speculators July 2005

Marie Antoinette and Peak Oil

History has witnessed plenty of predictions about technology. Many of those predictions had been made by famous people who were recognized as the most knowledgeable in their field.

Funny enough, most of those predictions turned out to be false and hence are termed as Famous False Predictions.

Meanwhile, there had also been many absurd predictions which became true. As Albert Einstein once said "If at first, the idea is not absurd, there is no hope for it." He also added "Problems cannot be solved by thinking within the framework in which the problems were created."

Below I give some famous predictions which I had collected (mostly) a long time ago. Most of them can be found on internet.

History has witnessed plenty of predictions about technology. Many of those predictions had been made by famous people who were recognized as the most knowledgeable in their field.

Funny enough, most of those predictions turned out to be false and hence are termed as Famous False Predictions.

Meanwhile, there had also been many absurd predictions which became true. As Albert Einstein once said "If at first, the idea is not absurd, there is no hope for it." He also added "Problems cannot be solved by thinking within the framework in which the problems were created."

Below I give some famous predictions which I had collected (mostly) a long time ago. Most of them can be found on internet.

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“I must confess that my imagination refuses to see any sort of submarine doing anything but suffocating its crew and floundering at sea.”
HG Wells, British novelist 1901.

Shortly after their historic first powered flight at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, in December, 1903, the Wright brothers patriotically offered their plane (Flyer) to the United States Army. The result? The army was so skeptical of the brothers' claims that they refused to see a flight demonstration until 1908.
By 1909, the army was using Wright brothers’ machinery for military use. (source)

"Airplanes are interesting toys, but of no military value."
French Marshal Ferdinand Foch Professor of Strategy. Ecole Superieure De Guerre. 1912.

"That Professor Goddar…does not know the relation of action to reaction, and of the need to have something better than a vacuum against which to react--to say that would be absurd. Of course he only seems to lack the knowledge ladled out daily in highschools.”
1921 New York Times Editorial about Robert Goddard's Revolutionary Rocket Work.

“Nobody now fears that a Japanese fleet could deal an unexpected blow on our Pacific possessions…radio makes surprise impossible.”
Josephus Daniels, former US Secretary of the Navy, 16 October 1922.

"No matter what happens, the U.S. Navy is not going to be caught napping."
U.S. Secretary of Navy, 4 December 1941.

"The [atomic] bomb will never go off, and I speak as an expert in explosives.”
Admiral William Leahy to President Truman in 1945, on US Atomic Bomb Project.

"The wireless music box has no imaginable commercial value. Who would pay for a message sent to nobody in particular?”
David Sarnoff's associates in response to his urgings for investment in the radio in the 1920's.

“Television won’t be able to hold on to any market it captures after the first six months. People will soon get tired of staring at a plywood box every night.”
Darryl F. Zanuck, head of 20th Century Fox, 1946.

"Everything that can be invented has been invented."
Charles H. Duell, Commissioner, U.S. Office of Patents, 1899.

"Man will never reach the moon regardless of all future scientific advances."
Dr. Lee De Forest, inventor of the vacuum tube.

"Heavier-than-air flying machines are impossible."
Lord Kelvin, President, Royal Society, 1895.

“That the automobile has practically reached the limit of its development is suggested by the fact that during the past year no improvements of a radical nature have been introduced.”
Scientific American, 2 January 1909.

Rail travel at high speeds is not possible because passengers, unable to breathe, would die of asphyxia”
British scientist Dionysius Lardner, 1923.

"With over 50 foreign cars already on sale here, the Japanese auto industry isn't likely to carve out a big slice of the US market."
Business Week, 2 August 1968.

"My personal desire would be to prohibit entirely the use of alternating current [the basis of today's electrical systems]. They are [as] un-necessary as they are dangerous.”
Thomas A. Edison, North American Review, 1889.

“In fifteen years more electricity will be sold for electric vehicles than for light”
Thomas Edison, 1902.

“There is not the slightest indication that nuclear energy will ever be obtainable. It would mean that the atom would have to be shattered at will.”
Albert Einstein, 1974.

"Drill for oil ? You mean drill into the ground to try and find oil ? You're crazy.”
Drillers Edwin Drake tried to recruit to drill for oil in 1859.

Soon after oil was discovered there have been several crying wolves warning about running out of oil. For example, as early as 1919, the head of USGS forecasted that the end would come in 9 years. (Newsweek, 16 February 2004)

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Many of those false predictions are used by Marie-Antoinette[1] like minded people to dismiss or debunk Peak Oil. They claim that sufficient investment and technological advancement (Marie-Antoinette’s cake) will bring the required amount of oil into the market.

Ultra deep Jack #2 in Gulf of Mexico, ethanol, tar-sands, extra heavy oil, coal-to-liquids, gas-to-liquids, hydrogen etc are shown as different types of cakes.

What those people do not understand is that crude oil is a non-renewable natural resource. It cannot be invented. Unlike technologies once it is discovered, and later on extracted, it is depleted. Once Peak is reached exctraction rate declines.

Marie-Antoinette like minded people or daylight dreamers believe that money and technology are the Angles which will help in avoiding the Peak.

However, in the real world money and technology can only delay the Peak but cannot avoid it.

Money and technology cannot find oil which is not there.

They can surely help recover more oil from fields but production from new discoveries and from extended recovery will not be able to add 35 Mb/d extra more oil on top of today’s 85 Mb/d by 2030 (to reach 120 Mb/d forecasted by respected institutions).

Ignoring depletion and believing blindly in money and technology is like saying “Amen” to a pray which does not exist!

Many analysts have long been warning about the probable consequences of Peak Oil and have been calling for an early action for mitigation. But as Chinese proverb correctly states "When a finger points to the moon the imbecile looks at the finger."


Notes:
[1] Marie-Antoinette was a naive, 14-year-old Austrian who married Louis-Auguste (Louis XVI of France) is famous with her saying "If they have no bread, then let them eat cake!" while the peasants starved during a shortage of bread in the country. Some people argue that she is incorrectly quoted. Well, well…

Peak Oil

Hearing on DoD Energy Consumption

On September 26, 2006, the House Armed Services Subcommittees on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities and Readiness held a joint hearing to assess the DOD’s efforts at reducing energy consumption, increasing energy efficiency, and developing alternate fuel sources.

Below are the main messages (according to me) in the written testimonies of the witnesses.

John Young, Director of Defense Research and Engineering and Phil Grone, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Installations and Environment (DoD) submitted a joint testimony (pdf) which starts with an overview of US military energy consumption. Mobility fuels (for aircrafts, ships and vehicles) with 74%, and buildings and facilities with 22% account almost all DoD energy usage. In terms of fuel types, jet fuel[1] accounts for 58%, marine diesel 13%, electricity 11%, fuel oil 3% and gasoline 2.3% of total energy consumption.

They then mention the DoD energy initiatives such as the Defense Science Board Task force on DoD Energy Strategy and the Energy Security Task Force (later on they suggest new ones). But the table presenting DoD’s plans to invest $2.2 billion on energy related efforts between FY2007 and FY2011 is not discussed. Instead they mention that the DoD reduced facilities energy use by 28% in 2005 (compared to 1985 baseline measured by energy use per square foot), and that installations received almost 9% of their electricity from renewables which is targeted to be increased to 25% by 2025, and that use of more efficient power sources, such as batteries, transportable hybrid electric power stations and fuel cells are further studied.

They see turbine engine technologies as key for improving specific fuel consumption up to 25% but full engine demonstrations are expected not before 2014. Investment in research on lightweight materials and structures, such as the application of carbon-fiber reinforced composites and titanium alloys (alternative to steel), will reduce the cost and hence will enable those expensive aerospace materials affordably used in ground vehicles and ships.

Concerning non-tactical vehicle fleet on installations, they talk about the new vehicles running on alternative fuels and on technologies that many increase fuel efficiency.
An important part of the testimony is the recent synfuel test on B-52 and the DESC request for information to determine industry capability to produce 200 million gallons of synthetic jet fuel[2] beginning in January 2009.

Richard Connelly, Director of DESC, testified (pdf) about the, “significant interest” with 28 firms responding to that request, 22 of them intended to manufacture synthetic fuel. 20 of them proposed using the Fisher-Tropsch Coal-to-Liquid process. In the testimony he gives the risk mitigation requirements identified by the respondents before they could engage in such a development: long term contracts (15 to 25 years) with guaranteed minimum annual DoD purchases at a guaranteed minimum price, with possibly including tax credit, loan guarantees and no carbon sequestration requirement in the contract. In other words, they simply asked the DoD to assume most (if not all) of the risk by exposing the Pentagon to a significant risk of paying much more than the market price for fuel. Connelly gives the crude oil price threshold to support development in the future to be in the $53-$57 per barrel range. He concludes that if the desired end is to mitigate the price fluctuations it is good, but if the desired end is solely to promote an industry then the cost to taxpayers may be significant.

Michael Aimone, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Installations and Mission Support, USAF, highlighted (pdf) the vision of the new Air Force energy strategy: “creating as culture where Airmen make energy a consideration in every action.” The strategy is to develop future fuel sources for assured mobility and to promote strong demand side conservation initiatives. After citing the recent synfuel test of a B-52 he stated the goal of the Air Force to have at least 50 percent of aviation fuel derived from domestic assured sources of supplies by 2016.

Scott Sklar, President of the Stella Group Ltd, gives in his testimony (pdf) documents many Executive Orders issued by the US government, studies funded by the government which are “on a shelf” and argues that “information needs to be centralized, referenced and easily accessed.” He basically promotes his company’s products such as solar panel blanket that can power field phones, PV, fuel cells etc.

To me, he tries to stress the need for such products by giving Marine Corps Major General Richard Zilmer’s (chief of Multi-National Force-West in al-Anbar province) urgent request in August 2006 calling on the Pentagon to send more renewable energy systems because they could leverage resources like sunlight or wind to produce power for bases and outposts, and would lessen dependence on fossil fuels.

His conclusion is interesting though: “Reliance on old technologies is a luxury that can no longer be supported. These traditional technologies – standard battery banks, diesel engines, and grid-intertied systems – are too easy to disable, are unreliable, and do not have long term “staying” power necessary for the emergencies we all may realistically face.”

Mark Wagner, member of Federal Performance Contracting Coalition, Business Council for Sustainable Energy gives in his testimony (pdf) the results of the September 2005 CERL report on “Trends and Implications for U.S. Army Installations.” He claims that deployment of efficiency and alternative energy technologies at more military installations is critical for the DoD. By citing the success and effectiveness of Energy Conservation and Improvement program with a constant budget of $50 million in the past 15 years, he asks where to get the extra money needed. He recommends Utility Energy Saving Contracts and Energy Savings Performance Contracting programs which allows energy efficiency projects to be financed with private sector capital.

James T. Bartis, senior policy analyst, RAND Corporation, had a very clear and concise testimony (pdf). He sees two technically viable substitutes to crude oil that could come from domestic resources - oil shale and coal-to-liquids. He argues that although promising, oil shale remains a very expensive option for producing liquid fuels. Besides that today technically viable approaches for using renewable resources to produce significant amounts of JP-8 or similar fuels are very limited. The potential for bio-diesel produced from vegetable oils is severely limited because of a) low oil yields per cultivated acre, b) the amount of suitable arable land available.

Therefore this testimony concentrates on options for coal-to-liquids fuel production. He argues that the prospects for a commercial coal-to-liquids industry in the US remain unclear due to uncertainties related to the costs, production, performance, future oil prices, and CO2 emissions.

That is why he claims an immediate commitment as well as subsidizing it could be very expensive, risky and counterproductive at this time. He also cautions against the use of federal loan guarantees. This caution, in fact, contradicts with both Chairmen’s opening remarks which stressed that as the largest oil consumer in the US, the DoD’s efforts should “exercise a leadership role” in adopting alternative fuel sources.

It would be extremely interesting to know what is talked on Q&A session of the hearing, which is not made public.

Remarks and questions

I do not understand why this kind of hearings and reports concentrate too much cherry picked examples in investigating how to reduce US military energy consumption and dependency. The cherry picked and isolated examples, like the World Bank routinely does in demonstrating how their programs work(ed), do hide widely adaptable answers.

Electricity is surely very important but it is oil that constitutes three thirds of US military energy consumption. Why then so much emphasis to installation and facilities energy consumption and avoid the mobility fuel consumption, especially of the Air Force?

Are the energy efficient future turbine technologies and alternative fuels enough for Air Force to go green?

The recent synfuel test on B-52 was a good point for demonstrating the efforts towards making the current aircraft fleet consume less oil based fuel. Will Pentagon do the same for C-17s?

Pentagon has 180 C-17 Globemaster (claimed to be the best long-range military transport aircraft ever built by all accounts) in its stock. Further procurement is stopped[3] and old ones are not allowed to retire (similar is the case for B-52s). Because the current fleet, according to Pentagon, is enough to meet strategic airlift needs for the foreseeable future.

Fine, Pentagon wants to keep its current fleet and add new technologically advanced ones. But what do we really know about the future technology aircrafts? We heard a lot about F-22A and F-35s but how about the ones (such as Polecat and Aurora) at the flight test center near Groom Lake, Nevada (known as Area 51)? Do those programs exist? If exist, on which fuel those aircrafts of the future run? Hydrogen?

However, one good news is that the US military oil consumption gets an increasing attention, both inside and outside of the DoD.

Inside the DoD, already there are several Task Forces on energy and new ones are planned to come.

Outside the DoD, there are more and more conferences and publications discussing and questioning the US military energy consumption.

For example, the 2nd Annual Military Energy Alternatives Conference, organized by Marcusevans on February 19-21 February, 2007 in Virgina, is announced to explore the current alternative energy sources available to the DoD. According to the events summary[4] there will be discussions on “Reducing fuel requirements with alternative technologies, advancing defense testing and evaluation, examining developments in Fischer-Tropsch Technologies, fuel cell options for the military, advancing battery technology” etc. In addition “it will seek to understand current and future applications of alternative fuels, and the impact on combat operations, efficiency and potential DoD savings.”

Yes, there are lots talks, reports, conferences, task forces, hearings, etc dealing with possible solutions for the unsustainable US military energy consumption. And yet almost all lack the determination of the problem. What is the problem?

Does Pentagon understand the problem? Probably not. But it is aware of it.

Is pentagon worried about current or future energy consumption? Does Pentagon know how much energy by fuel type, by service and by end-use it consumes, in and outside of the US? I don’t think so.

Does Pentagon have an estimate of its current and future equipment/fleet/device stock and their future energy consumption? I don’t know but I don’t think so.

Does Pentagon care of environment? I don’t know. Have you ever seen any talk about the severe environmental damage that could eventually be caused by the lost nuclear submarines?

Time has come to reconsider the problem from the beginning.


Notes:
[1] Jet fuel is used in aircrafts and non-aircraft platforms such as tanks, other ground vehicles and generators.
[2] 100 million of synJP-8 for the Air Force and another 100 million gallon of synJP-5 for the Navy.
[3] By the way, more or less at the same time a Letter of Intent publicly released by 13 NATO Allies launched contract negotiations for the purchase of C-17s.
[4] By the wa, it was interesting to see my estimates concerning the US military oil consumption in Iraq and Afghanistan (56,000 barrels of oil per day, with a cost of at least $3 million) in the conference announcement.

US Military Energy Consumption